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47 
The Origins of the  
Iowa Development Commission:  
Agricultural Transformation  
and Industrial Development  
in Mid–Twentieth-Century Iowa  
KEITH OREJEL 
ON JULY 1, 1945, the Fifty-first Iowa General Assembly passed 
an act creating the Iowa Development Commission (IDC). The 
commission, as a later report explained, was to serve as the “state’s 
official promotional agency,” tasked with overseeing postwar 
economic development. The state legislature assigned the IDC a 
“three-fold responsibility”: (1) research, specifically the “collec-
tion of facts and figures pertinent to Iowa’s economy”; (2) infor-
mation, centering on a “program of publicity and education 
about Iowa”; and (3) promotion, defined as “the procurement of 
new industrial enterprise, and the encouragement of existing 
business and industry.” The IDC’s membership was composed 
largely of “business and professional men,” along with a handful 
of state legislators, all of whom were appointed by the governor. 
A professional staff headed by a salaried director oversaw the 
group’s day-to-day operations.1  
 Although it received only modest attention at the time, the 
creation of the Iowa Development Commission was a ground- 
breaking event. The IDC was the first of its kind within the state— 
                                                 
1. “Report of Activities of the Iowa Development Commission,” 1, 24, folder: Misc. 
1952, box 1, Economic Development Collection: Commission Minutes and Related 
Materials, 1940–1954, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines (SHSI-DM).  
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a permanent government agency dedicated primarily to promot-
ing industrialization.2 With the formation of the IDC, the state of 
Iowa entered a modern era of government-sponsored economic 
development, as the public sector played an expansive role in the 
pursuit of manufacturing and other enterprises. A bold move 
into the cutthroat competition for new industry, the creation of 
the IDC represented a direct response to long-term agricultural 
transformations and new industrial opportunities that con-
verged during World War II.  
 Since the 1920s, farmers throughout rural America had con-
fronted a volatile global market, with declining crop prices re-
sulting in shrinking incomes and rising farm foreclosure rates. In 
an attempt to hold on to their property and maintain their stand-
ards of living, many farmers adopted new practices aimed at in-
creasing productivity. Farmers with available capital invested in 
machinery (primarily tractors) and other technological innova-
tions to maximize output. But these decisions not only failed to 
alleviate the plight of the farmer, they also initiated structural 
transformations that undermined the fabric of rural society. In-
creased output drove prices down further, necessitating ever 
greater production to survive. The social implications of these 
developments were staggering. As rural historian David 
Danbom has shown, “The minority of farmers whose ownership 
of tractors increased productivity intensified economic pressures 
on others.” Many farmers mortgaged their property to the hilt in 
order to keep up, while those unable to compete “withdrew from 
agriculture, usually by selling to expanding neighbors.” With 
“fewer farms and declining labor needs on those that remained,” 
the “pace of rural-to-urban migration” reached new heights. 
Outmigration led to the “deterioration of rural social networks,” 
since “depopulation” resulted in “fewer parishioners for 
churches and fewer pupils for schools.” Local businesses and 
other institutions also buckled under the weight of mass exodus.3 
                                                 
2. An examination of state institutions listed in the Iowa Official Register for the 
years 1882, 1886, 1890, 1894, 1898, 1902, 1906, 1909/1910, 1915/1916, 1921/1922, 
1927/1928, 1933/1934, and 1939/1940 suggests that no comparable organiza-
tion existed in Iowa prior to World War II. 
3. My main source for this broad sketch is David B. Danbom’s wonderfully syn-
thetic survey, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 
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  Despite attempts by federal bureaucrats to limit overproduc-
tion during the 1930s, the New Deal did not significantly hinder 
the transformation of agriculture. In some ways, the New Deal 
propelled farm modernization. Federal agencies such as the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration and the Commodity Credit 
Corporation provided American farmers with infusions of capi-
tal through acreage reduction and price support programs. With 
fewer overall acres in use and more income generated by transfer 
payments and government-backed price levels, market-oriented 
farmers continued to improve their individual circumstances 
through greater productivity.4 
 Farm mechanization and rural outmigration were already 
issues by the early 1940s, but World War II accelerated those pro-
cesses. The global conflict catalyzed what some scholars have 
referred to as a “production revolution.” The number of tractors 
in use exploded during the war in response to labor shortages, 
resulting in the permanent replacement of manpower with ma-
chines. Simultaneously, rural and small-town inhabitants migrated 
en masse to nearby industrial centers to fill growing demand in 
wartime factories.5  
 Iowa was hit hard by agricultural restructuring. Farming in 
Iowa underwent the early stages of consolidation (a process that 
would continue for much of the century). Larger, more productive 
farms gobbled up smaller units, pushing many out of agriculture. 
                                                 
2006), 185–205 (quotes on 196–97). The literature on agriculture modernization 
in the twentieth century is expansive. A few notable studies have especially in-
formed my understanding: Daniel Nelson, Farm and Factory: Workers in the Mid-
west, 1880–1990 (Bloomington, IN, 1995); Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The 
Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures Since 1880 (Urbana, IL, 1985); 
Jack Temple Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920–1960 (Baton 
Rouge, LA, 1987); and Carolyn Dimitri, Anne Effland, and Neilson Conklin, 
“The Twentieth Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy,” 
Economic Information Bulletin No. 3, June 2005, Economic Research Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
4. Danbom, Born in the Country, 206–33. The historian Sarah Phillips has argued 
that New Deal farm policymakers were divided “between those who believed 
that farmers had to ‘get big or get out’ and those who claimed that more could 
be done to help farmers remain on their land.” Over time, federal policy “shifted 
toward those who believed that there were just too many farmers.” This Land, 
This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal (New York, 2007), 9–11. 
5. Danbom, Born in the Country, 233–39.  
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Between 1920 and 1950, Iowa’s farm population declined from 
984,799 to 790,424. Outmigration and depopulation caused the 
state as a whole to experience anemic population growth in the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, with increases of only 2.8, 2.7, and 3.3 
percent. The U.S. population, in comparison, grew by 16.1, 7.2, 
and 14.5 percent during the same decades.6  
 During World War II, these decades-old rural ailments inter-
sected with new industrial opportunities. In response to the out-
break of war in Europe, the state legislature in 1940 created the 
Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, which brought to-
gether a coalition of elected officials, agribusiness representatives, 
labor leaders, industrialists, and other notables. The commission 
melded state-level civilian defense with a campaign to acquire 
wartime industries. The acquisition of several major ordnance 
plants and smaller factories during the war created enthusiasm 
for industrial development. Proud of their accomplishments, but 
fearful of the potentially disastrous effects of peacetime recon-
version, state officials called for a permanent program of indus-
trialization after the conflict.  
 The Iowa Development Commission (IDC) was created in 
1945 out of the simultaneous confidence created by the war that 
new industry would come to Iowa and growing fears about the 
continual loss of farm jobs and rural inhabitants. In Iowa, indus-
trial development and agricultural transformations went hand in 
hand. But if changes in farming motivated many state officials to 
pursue industrialization, agricultural interests shaped the nature 
of Iowa’s postwar industrial campaign. Agribusiness represent-
atives, primarily the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, insisted that 
new industries should not infringe on large landholders’ access 
to cheap labor. Also, agricultural interests pressed for industries 
                                                 
6. Leon Edgar Truesdell, Farm Population: 1880 to 1950 (Washington, DC, 1960), 
table 14, p. 21, for 1920; table 20, p. 27, for 1950. Population data taken from 
Iowa Data Center Publication, “Total Population in Iowa Counties, 1850–2010,” 
www.iowadatacenter.org/archive/2011/02/countytotalpop.pdf. For U.S. popu-
lation data, see Frank Hobbs and Nicole Stoops, U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Special 
Reports, Series CENSR-4, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (Washington, 
DC, 2002), 13, at www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. For agricultural 
changes in Iowa, see Mark Friedberger, “The Modernization of Iowa’s Agricul-
tural Structure in the Twentieth Century,” in Iowa History Reader, ed. Marvin 
Bergman, 2nd ed. (Iowa City, 2008), esp. 378–84. 
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that would process farm products, thereby generating demand 
for their crops, eggs, milk, and meat.  
 The IDC addressed these various interests by laying out its 
vision for a “balanced economy.” In early promotional material, 
the IDC melded agricultural transformations and industrial de-
velopment into a blueprint that promised prosperity, harmony, 
and growth. In this synthesis, displaced agricultural producers 
and laborers, freed from farming by mechanization and scientific 
advancements, would staff newly acquired industries. Promising 
mutual benefit to both agriculture and industry, the IDC gave the 
most attention to recruiting enterprises that would utilize the 
state’s natural resources and farm products. Those business con-
cerns would then increase demand for Iowa’s abundant raw 
materials.  
 By analyzing the origins of the IDC, this article adds to the 
wealth of scholarship highlighting the interconnection between ag-
riculture and industry in the greater Midwest. In his classic work, 
Nature’s Metropolis, William Cronon emphasized the symbiotic 
relationship between city and countryside, showing how agri-
cultural production, resource extraction, and rural consumerism 
in the hinterland facilitated the rise of urban industrial Chicago.7 
More recent scholarship, most notably the valuable work of 
Wilson J. Warren, has emphasized the persistent importance of 
“agro-industrialization” in the economic development of Iowa 
and the Midwest. Farm-oriented industries, such as meatpacking 
and flour milling, have, since the nineteenth century, been at the 
center of the rural industrial economy.8 The early years of the 
                                                 
7. William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York, 1992).  
8. For the most comprehensive survey of “agro-industrialization” in the Mid-
west, see Wilson J. Warren, “Beyond the Rust Belt: The Neglected History of the 
Rural Midwest’s Industrialization after World War II,” in The Rural Midwest 
Since World War II, ed. J. L. Anderson (DeKalb, IL, 2014), 72–102. There are nu-
merous studies on meatpacking, food processing, and other agro-industrial en-
terprises. To cite just a small portion of this literature: Deborah Fink, Cutting into 
the Meatpacking Line: Workers and Change in the Rural Midwest (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1998); Nelson, Farm and Factory; Donald Stull, Michael J. Broadway, and David 
Griffith, eds., Any Way You Cut It: Meat Processing and Small-Town America (Law-
rence, KS, 1995); Wilson J. Warren, Struggling with ‘Iowa’s Pride’: Labor Relations, 
Unionism, and Politics in the Rural Midwest Since 1877 (Iowa City, 2000); idem, 
Tied to the Great Packing Machine: The Midwest and Meatpacking (Iowa City, 2007); 
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Iowa Development Commission represented one facet of these 
longstanding and well-documented development patterns.  
 At the same time, the IDC represented an important institu-
tional breakthrough in the history of rural industrialization, a 
development that has received little scholarly attention. The cre-
ation of the IDC signaled the state government’s modern stew-
ardship of economic development, elevating industrialization to 
official public policy. Much like James C. Cobb’s characterization 
of Mississippi’s Balance Agriculture with Industry program, the 
IDC embodied a “long-term commitment to state sanctioned and 
supervised economic development.”9 This article contributes to 
existing scholarship by showing how and why industrial de-
velopment became institutionalized in Iowa. Industrialization 
achieved a new level of government sponsorship during World 
War II because of concerns about rapid changes in agriculture. 
The precipitous decline in farm jobs led many state officials to 
conclude that only concerted government action could stem out-
migration. Faith in state intervention was reinforced by Iowa’s 
wartime experiment with industrial development. Iowa had ex-
perienced industrialization in the past, but it was the agrarian 
crisis of the mid–twentieth century that produced the modern 
form of government-directed development exemplified by the 
IDC.  
 It is important to note that this article, as the title indicates, is 
an origin story. The IDC would have a long career, operating 
under its original name until 1986, when it was replaced by the 
Department of Economic Development (which was later sup-
planted by the Iowa Economic Development Authority). Rather 
than tackling the organization’s entire history, this study exam-
ines the IDC’s founding and early promotional efforts, focusing 
especially on the interconnection between agriculture and indus-
trial development.  
 
                                                 
George May, “Recent Industrial Development” and “Iowa Industries,” Palimp-
sest 37 (1956), 229–88; L. O. Cheever, “Comments on 11 Years” and “Iowa In-
dustries,” Palimpsest 48 (1967), 93–118; L. O. Cheever, “Industries of Iowa—II,” 
and “Iowa Industries,” Palimpsest 49 (1968), 1–40.  
9. James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial De-
velopment, 1936–1980 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1982), 33.  
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THE IOWA Industrial Resources and Defense Council held its 
first meeting in the offices of Governor George A. Wilson at two 
o’clock on Tuesday, September 10, 1940, almost a year after the 
invasion of Poland by German forces, and roughly four months 
since the fall of France.10 Present at the meeting were representa-
tives from the most important interest groups in the state, includ-
ing A. A. Couch, president of the Iowa Federation of Labor; Frank 
Wilson, president of the Iowa United Mine Workers of America; 
Allen Klein, vice-chairman of the Iowa Farm Bureau; R. R. O’Brien, 
publisher of the Council Bluffs Nonpareil; George S. Call, a mem-
ber of the executive committee of the Midwest Defense Confer-
ence; J. Tracy Garrett, editor of the Burlington Hawkeye-Gazette; 
Ralph Smith, president of the Iowa Grange; Edward Kimball, 
president of the Iowa Manufacturers Association (a state branch 
of the National Association of Manufacturers); L. A. Rowland, 
vice-president of John Deere and Company; and Dale L. Maffitt, 
general manager of the Des Moines Water Works. The group’s 
diversity reflected the need for economic cooperation among all 
sectors of the Iowa economy, as well as for communication be-
tween public representatives and private interest groups, for the 
purpose of wartime preparedness. In the words of one member, 
the “cross-section of representation on the Council” was an at-
tempt at “unselfishness and working toward the welfare of both 
the state and the nation.”11 
 Governor Wilson started the gathering by laying out the goals 
and responsibilities of the newly formed group. Given recent 
developments across the globe, the central focus was Iowa’s role 
“in the national defense program.” Wilson called for the collection 
of data on “Iowa’s manufacturing, processes, transportation, re-
sources and labor,” all of which was meant to ensure that the state 
                                                 
10. Both events had a tremendous effect on American public opinion and pro-
duced increased calls for U.S. military preparedness. George C. Herring, From 
Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York, 2008), 519, 537. 
11. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Iowa Industrial Resources and Defense Coun-
cil, September 10, 1940,” 1, folder: 1940, 1941, box 1, Economic Development 
Collection: Commission Minutes and Related Materials, 1940–1954, SHSI-DM. 
For a general timeline on World War II military developments, see David Ken-
nedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 
(New York, 2005).  
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would be ready at a moment’s notice should the country start mo-
bilizing for war. Undergirding these grand ideals and national 
civic values, however, were more material and pragmatic con-
cerns. Wilson insisted that all “the information received by the 
Council” must be “made available to every community in Iowa” 
so that “the industries and citizens of the state may receive the full-
est benefit of this national expansion” of the defense sector. Wilson 
made clear that one of the commission’s central duties was “mak-
ing . . . applications for the location of new industries” in Iowa.12  
 Hovering over these initiatives were the menacing specters 
of outmigration and depopulation that had plagued Iowa since 
the 1920s. Commission member L. A. Rowland, vice-president of 
John Deere and Company, “expressed the opinion that labor 
supply was basic and that everything must be done to keep labor 
here in Iowa.” Noting that the “construction of munitions facto-
ries has a tendency to draw not alone men but supplies from 
Iowa for the industrial centers,” Rowland implicitly suggested 
that an agricultural state like Iowa could only hope to hold on to 
its domestic population and economic resources by achieving 
some degree of industrialization.13 Many in Iowa’s local com-
munities shared Rowland’s perspective. The Centerville Iowegian, 
the town of Centerville’s local newspaper, argued in 1940 that 
“southern Iowa has many ex-farmers and coal miners who are 
now jobless. They must either remain in the small towns on relief 
or go to the cities to get work.”14  
 Council members realized that the imperatives of modern 
warfare played to their advantage. Observers of the international 
scene forecasted that total war, especially the aerial bombard-
ments witnessed during the Spanish Civil War and the invasion 
of Poland, made the concentration of industrial facilities in large 
urban centers a defensive liability.15 As a result, Frank Wilson of 
                                                 
12. “Minutes of the Meeting of the IIRDC, September 10, 1940,” 2. 
13. Ibid., 3.  
14. “Iowa Industrial Institute Seeks War Industries,” Centerville Iowegian, 12/19/ 
1940.  
15. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 
1776 (New York, 2008), 484. An excellent discussion of aerial warfare’s psycho-
logical effects and its political ramifications for the larger world can be found in 
Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York, 2005), and idem, The Third 
Reich at War (New York, 2009).  
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the Iowa United Mine Workers of America asserted, “We were 
undoubtedly headed toward the decentralization of industry,” 
which would “apparently be accomplished by the necessity of 
national defense.” Governor Wilson made similar claims in nu-
merous public statements, arguing on one occasion, “If there is 
any single lesson which has come out of Europe, it is that the de-
centralization of defense industry is equal in importance to the 
scattering of airports.”16 
 From the Defense Council’s first meeting it was apparent that 
Iowa’s industrial development program would have to accom-
modate itself to the demands of agribusiness. Allen Klein, vice-
chairman of the Farm Bureau, insisted that all “new plants will 
require” a “proper relation to agriculture.” Klein spoke for 
Iowa’s “agricultural interests” when he argued that “considera-
tion” in “locating industries” had to be given to ensure that there 
would be “no shortage or surplus of labor.” While Klein claimed 
to have the interests of rural and small-town communities at 
heart, he was obviously attempting to protect agribusiness’s ac-
cess to cheap labor when he concluded, “Larger industries must 
be located near larger communities.”17  
 The first meeting of the Iowa Industrial Resources and De-
fense Council, which would soon be renamed the Iowa Industrial 
and Defense Commission (IIDC), set the tone for the organiza-
tion’s wartime operations. The IIDC would play a dual role. On 
the one hand, it would ensure military preparedness and domestic 
defense by coordinating with representatives from agriculture, 
industry, and labor. Simultaneously, it would attempt to bring de-
fense, munitions, and ordnance plants to the state. Policymakers 
rationalized and justified these measures by arguing that Iowa 
would lose inhabitants to urban centers outside the state if it did 
not acquire manufacturing enterprises of its own. Implicit within 
this argument was a growing concern that Iowa was too depen-
dent on farm jobs, which not only paid less than their industrial 
counterparts but also were in shrinking supply as a result of 
mechanization. By war’s end, this implicit logic would become 
                                                 
16. “Minutes of the IIRDC, September 10, 1940,” 3; “Wilson Says Iowa Suited 
for Some Defense Industry,” Centerville Iowegian, 8/27/1940.  
17. “Minutes of the IIRDC, September 10, 1940,” 4. 
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an explicit argument as the need to replace agricultural employ-
ment with industrial jobs would be the central rationale for the 
creation of the Iowa Development Commission.  
 Between 1940 and 1945, the IIDC aggressively campaigned 
to attain defense contracts. In March 1941 the commission passed 
a motion calling for Governor Wilson to travel to Washington, 
D.C., to “confer with the Iowa senators and the Iowa congres-
sional delegation on the problem of obtaining industries for 
Iowa.” In July of that same year the commission decided to ac-
quire new office space and hire more employees to establish 
“a branch office of the Defense Contract Service Division of the 
Office Production Management,” an attempt to solicit federal 
contracts. These initiatives had significant success, as defense 
spending in Iowa skyrocketed, rising to $57 million by March 
1941 and then to $68 million the following month.18   
 What exactly did the IIDC do to bring new industry to Iowa? 
Primarily, members of the IIDC worked closely with communities 
that wanted to secure defense-related industries. The IIDC’s most 
important function was facilitating interaction among local towns, 
Iowa’s congressmen, and wartime government agencies. The at-
tempt to secure a corn alcohol plant for the small town of Eagle 
Grove provides a compelling example of how the IIDC navi-
gated various political channels in pursuit of wartime industries. 
On March 4, 1941, a “delegation of business men” from Eagle 
Grove met with the IIDC to “discuss the possibilities of corn al-
cohol [plant] construction in northern Iowa.” On March 13, IIDC 
Secretary Rodney Q. Selby met with the director of the Agricul-
tural Experiment Station at Iowa State College “to ask him to 
prepare material” on the manufacture of corn alcohol that “could 
be presented to defense production agencies in Washington.” 
About a week later, Selby visited Washington, D.C., to meet with 
Senator Guy M. Gillette (D-IA) to explain how these plants could 
produce corn alcohol necessary for the production of explosives. 
Gillette also proposed the possibility that corn alcohol could be 
                                                 
18. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, 
March 26, 1941,” folder: 1940, 1941, box 1, Economic Development Collection: 
Commission Minutes and Related Materials, 1940–1954, SHSI-DM; “Minutes of 
the Meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, July 23, 1941,” 
ibid.; Lisa L. Ossian, The Home Fronts of Iowa, 1939–1945 (Columbia, MO, 2009), 51. 
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used as a motor fuel. After receiving the report produced by 
agricultural experts at Iowa State, Senator Gillette promised to 
discuss the finding with the secretary of war. Selby also dissemi-
nated the material to Iowa Democratic Senator Clyde Herring and 
“other members of Iowa’s delegation in Congress.”19  
 Although the War Department recognized the importance of 
ethyl alcohol for military purposes, notably in the production of 
smokeless powder, it informed Senator Gillette and the IIDC that 
the “present facilities will be adequate to supply . . . military 
needs.” Nonetheless, the IIDC pounced on its newfound access to 
federal wartime bureaucracies. In April 1941 IIDC Secretary Selby 
met with P. H. Groggins, a chemical consultant who worked with 
the Council of National Defense, to once again promote the con-
struction of corn alcohol plants in Iowa. Groggins reaffirmed the 
War Department’s initial assessment, informing the IIDC official 
that there was little demand for industrial corn-based alcohol.20 
  This did not deter Iowa’s public officials, however. On May 
20, 1941, Governor George Wilson, IIDC Chair Edward Kimball, 
and Secretary Selby met with Under Secretary of War Robert Pat-
terson and two officials from the Office of Production Manage-
ment to once again press for the “construction of corn alcohol 
plants in Iowa as a needed war production measure.” In January 
1942, the IIDC held a meeting in Ames, to discuss how corn al-
cohol could be used “as an adjunct to synthetic rubber manu-
facture.” Throughout February and March 1942, IIDC officials 
continued to travel to Washington to champion corn alcohol as a 
viable ingredient for the manufacture of synthetic rubber and ex-
plosive devices.21  
 In March 1942 the entire process came full circle when Otto 
Knudsen, a local businessman from Eagle Grove, joined Selby 
and several IIDC members on a trip to Washington, D.C. The 
group met with Senator Gillette, numerous Iowa representatives, 
and Vice-President Henry A. Wallace to once again push for the 
construction of corn alcohol factories in Iowa. At one point, Dean 
                                                 
19. Untitled report, Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission, July 15, 1942, 1, 
folder: 1943, box 1, Economic Development Collection: Commission Minutes 
and Related Materials, 1940–1954, SHSI-DM. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., 2–3.  
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Buchanan, director of Iowa State College’s Agricultural Exper-
iment Station, was called to testify before a U.S. Senate sub-
committee on the prospect of corn alcohol production within the 
state. The campaign remained active throughout the summer of 
1942, with IIDC member A. A. Couch lobbying in “Washington 
. . . to forward the promotion of corn alcohol plant construction.” 
In the latter months of 1942, Iowa’s spokespersons focused their 
sales pitch on the use of grain alcohol in the production of syn-
thetic rubber. Within Congress, Iowa’s elected officials, most no-
tably Senator Gillette, pushed hard to convince their colleagues 
that grain alcohol could replace the then dominant petroleum in 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber.22  
 Despite early setbacks, the IIDC’s campaign was an eventual 
success, as Iowa received numerous military contracts to manu-
facture alcohol from corn and other grain products. In early 1943 
the federal government initiated an ambitious program to spur 
the production of grain alcohol, which resulted in the construc-
tion of several industrial plants in Iowa. In February 1943 the 
Grain Processing Corporation of Muscatine, signed a contract 
with the federal Defense Plants Corporation to build a factory 
that would “produce 8,500,000 gallons of alcohol a year” for sale 
to “the defense supplies corporation” as part of the production 
of synthetic rubber. The following month, the cities of Dubuque 
and Keokuk were also picked as sites for federally sponsored 
grain alcohol plants. Perhaps most heartening for the IIDC was 
the announcement on March 10, 1943, that Otto Knudsen’s Iowa 
Farm Processing Cooperative was “allocated the contract to con-
struct and operate the Dubuque plant,” and that the town of 
Eagle Grove had also been selected as a site for one of five other 
future grain alcohol plants. Both measures were fitting since 
Knudsen and Eagle Grove had been deeply involved in lobbying 
for wartime grain alcohol production.23  
                                                 
22. Ibid., 3–4; “Grain Alcohol-Synthetic Rubber Fight to Senate Floor Today,” 
Centerville Iowegian, 7/20/1943. See also “Gillette in New Inquiry,” Centerville 
Iowegian, 1/5/1943. For the broader history of this campaign, see Mark Finlay, 
Growing American Rubber: Strategic Plants and the Politics of National Security 
(New Brunswick, NJ, 2009), esp. ch. 5.  
23. “Gillette Predicts Gov’t to Expand Alcohol Program,” Centerville Iowegian, 
3/6/1943; Finlay, Growing American Rubber, 190–97; “Contract for Alcohol Plant 
Given Muscatine: Facilities to Produce 8,500,000 Gallons a Year,” Centerville 
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 Grain alcohol plants represented just one part of Iowa’s war-
time industrial boom. Several large-scale munitions and ord-
nance facilities located in the state, along with a host of smaller 
defense-related enterprises. One of the earliest and most note-
worthy acquisitions was the Iowa Ordnance Plant, located near 
the city of Burlington. Construction of the massive factory began 
in January 1941, and the $60 million ordnance plant was officially 
dedicated on July 31, 1941. By the end of the war, the Iowa Ord-
nance Plant, according to historian Lisa Ossian, would turn out 
“25 million mortar shells, 200,000 medium-caliber shells, 5 mil-
lion major-caliber shells, and 2.5 million bombs.” The Iowa Ord-
nance Plant was soon followed by the Des Moines Ordnance 
Plant, an equally impressive munitions factory located in the 
suburban community of Ankeny. Along with these behemoth 
acquisitions, a slew of private businesses converted their plants 
for wartime production. In southern Iowa, the Hercules Manu-
facturing Plant, located in the town of Centerville, refitted its op-
erations and by 1943 was “wholly in the production of defense 
materials,” including the manufacturing of “steel casing and ma-
chining” as well as “stump pullers.”24  
 Along with its promotional duties, the IIDC also played a 
central role in helping local communities adjust to rapid indus-
trialization. In May 1941 IIDC Chair Edward Kimball made a per-
sonal visit to Burlington’s Iowa Ordnance Plant. After inspecting 
the facilities, he appointed Burlington residents to an advisory 
committee that would inform the IIDC on “problems” relating 
to industrialization. The IIDC addressed some of the primary 
issues related to wartime industrial development, such as press-
ing for legislation that would help meet the demand for housing 
in cities and towns that gained defense contracts.25  
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 World War II generated newfound interest in industrial de-
velopment as the state successfully acquired defense and muni-
tions plants. To a degree never before witnessed, Iowa’s elected 
officials, small-town business leaders, and various interest groups 
campaigned to bring industry to their state. Wartime mobilization 
offered these public and private citizens access to Congress, fed-
eral bureaucracies, and even the executive branch. World War II 
provided firsthand experience in industrial development. The 
global conflict offered local and state actors a model for industri-
alizing Iowa and a sense of excitement that the state’s agricul-
tural economy could be diversified with manufacturing.  
 
WHILE WARTIME INDUSTRY BOOMED in Iowa, the state’s 
farm sector was undergoing dramatic changes with long-term 
implications. These two processes were directly connected. An 
abundance of well-paying manufacturing jobs drew farmers and 
laborers off the land. Farm jobs tended to pay less than manufac-
turing employment, so thousands of field hands, tenant farmers, 
and even independent landholders left agriculture in search of 
industrial employment. Many rural and small-town inhabitants 
fled their communities for Iowa’s booming industrial areas or ur-
ban centers elsewhere in the region, such as Detroit or Chicago. 
As a result, farmers experienced a dire labor shortage. To make 
up for the lack of available manpower, farmers turned to machines. 
Farm mechanization greatly expanded during World War II. 
Sales of tractors and other equipment spiked throughout the con-
flict. These capital investments then created an autocatalytic effect, 
whereby a labor shortage resulted in mechanization, which then 
eliminated agricultural jobs for good. The number of farm laborers 
decreased significantly during the war. As the conflict continued, 
it became clear that farming would not produce postwar job 
growth.26  
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 But even as transformations in farming helped to fuel the 
growing desire for new industry, agribusiness continued to deter-
mine the contours of the state’s industrial development program. 
Public officials’ dogged promotion of grain alcohol factories ex-
emplified the obeisance paid to agricultural elites. Grain alcohol 
plants promised not only wartime industrial jobs for Iowans but 
also increased demand for the state’s agricultural products. Even 
the IIDC’s own internal documents made clear that the whole 
campaign was due to “the efforts of agricultural interests to in-
duce the government to build plants in Iowa for converting sur-
plus grain to alcohol.”27 
 As the tide shifted in 1943 and 1944 and it became clear that the 
Allies would defeat Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, policy-
makers prepared plans to carry Iowa’s industrial development 
program into the postwar era. After the conflict, agribusiness 
would once again shape industrialization in Iowa.  
 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS, buoyed by their positive experiences with 
wartime industrialization, began to argue for the continuation of 
state industrial development initiatives during peacetime. As 
early as August 1942 the IIDC was in conversation with Governor 
Wilson about creating a Post War Planning Committee. By De-
cember 1943, the IIDC was preparing to hold a joint meeting with 
the recently established State Post War Rehabilitation Commission 
(PWRC) “with a view to coordinating the activities of the two bod-
ies.” The IIDC not only offered to share its office space and staff 
with the PWRC, but the IIDC’s chairman, Edward Kimball, along 
with several other officials, also served as members of the PWRC.28   
 In April 1944 IIDC Secretary Selby disseminated material pro-
posing the “organization [of] a permanent Industrial Develop- 
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ment Commission.” At the same time, Governor Bourke Hicken-
looper (who succeeded George Wilson in 1943) called on the 
commission to “undertake a program of industrial promotion by 
compiling information relative to the State’s resources, opportu-
nities and potentialities as far as raw materials, transportation, 
labor and other features . . . for presentation to prospective in-
dustrial establishments.” In December 1944 the IIDC sent Chair-
man Kimball and Secretary Selby to Topeka to examine the Kan-
sas Industrial Development Commission. Apparently impressed 
with their findings, the IIDC appointed a committee composed 
of several members of the state legislature to “draft a bill for 
presentation to the Fifty-first General Assembly, which would 
provide for the creation of the Iowa Development Commission.”29 
It was clear by mid- to late 1944 that Iowa was gearing up for a 
major industrial development drive after the war ended.  
 In January 1945 IIDC members discussed the recently drafted 
bill that proposed the creation of the Iowa Development Com-
mission and decided to recommend its referral to the appropriate 
committees within the Iowa House and Senate. In March 1945 
the last recorded meeting of the Iowa Industrial and Defense 
Commission took place. Chairman Kimball informed the group 
that the law to create the Iowa Development Commission had 
passed. At the same meeting, copies of the Iowa Development 
Commission’s first promotional book, Iowa . . . Land of Industrial 
Opportunity, were passed out to each member of the soon-to-be 
defunct IIDC. The next time the organization released its meeting 
minutes, on July 13, 1945, the letterhead read “Iowa Develop-
ment Commission.”30  
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BY THE TIME the General Assembly approved the creation of 
the Iowa Development Commission in 1945, Robert D. Blue had 
replaced Bourke Hickenlooper as the governor of Iowa. Sworn 
into office in 1945, Blue oversaw the creation of the IDC and offi-
cially signed the legislation that brought the organization into 
existence. Archival records from Blue’s administration provide 
insight into the motivations behind the creation of the IDC. 
Governor Blue’s departmental files include a brief analysis of the 
importance of natural gas for new industry. This document offered 
a succinct explanation for the IDC’s formation, showing that Iowa’s 
campaign for industrial development was a direct response to the 
social effects of farm mechanization and rural outmigration.  
Through improved farming methods and equipment, the number 
of people engaged in agriculture in Iowa has been less each year. . . . 
This farm population has generally moved out of the State and into 
more congested areas. . . . For the good of the country as a whole, 
and for the good of Iowa in particular, it seems appropriate that 
every effort should be taken to develop the present industries in 
Iowa and secure additional ones, at least to an extent that will 
absorb the farm boys and girls that are not going to be needed in 
agriculture.  
 The State of Iowa, through its legislators, has created the Iowa 
Development Commission. Part of the duties and objects of this 
Commission are to aid in the industrial development of Iowa.31  
 The impending downward slide of agricultural employment 
and the population outmigration that this implied were clearly 
on the minds of Iowa’s public officials and policymakers when 
the IDC was first created. In November 1945 Governor Blue com-
missioned Professor Ray Wakeley of Iowa State College to pro-
duce a study on population trends and their implications for the 
state’s future. A letter from Professor William Murray, head of 
the Department of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts at Iowa 
State, to the college’s president, Dr. Charles E. Friley, laid out the 
report’s central findings: The “Iowa farm population is decreasing 
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slowly,” and the state needed more “business and industrial de-
velopment.” The report itself noted the “increased migration out 
of Iowa,” detailing how the “farm population” had “declined . . . 
with increasing rapidity from 1920 to the present [1945].”32 The 
existence of such a dire report on the eve of the postwar period 
highlighted a growing awareness that overdependence on agri-
culture implied the perpetual loss of young, educated citizens 
and a shrinking population.  
 While declining agricultural employment motivated public 
officials to extend industrial development into the postwar era, 
the farm economy remained interwoven with visions of Iowa’s 
industrial future. Iowa . . . Land of Industrial Opportunity, the IDC’s 
first promotional book, captured the ongoing affiliation between 
agriculture and industry in the postwar period. Much like their 
wartime counterparts, members of the IDC argued that a mas-
sive “decentralization” of American industry was taking place. 
The movement of war-related industries had been motivated by 
defense imperatives; the relocation of private industry after the 
war, however, was compelled by political and economic factors. 
The defining feature of this industrial restructuring was manu-
facturing’s “movement away from congested industrial centers” 
to “new locations” outside of urban America. A myriad of reasons 
were offered for industry’s flight from urban areas: high taxes, 
unfriendly attitudes toward business, excessive costs, and over-
paid and impetuous laborers. Regardless of motivations, the trend 
was clear: manufacturers were looking for new homes outside of 
their traditional urban industrial locations.33  
 The central goal of Iowa’s industrial development campaign, 
according to Land of Industrial Opportunity, was to achieve a “bal- 
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anced economy.” The concept of a “balanced economy” repre-
sented an attempt to align Iowa’s agricultural legacy with its in-
dustrial aspirations. According to promoters, “Iowa does not desire 
to become an industrial center” but rather to “increase gradually her 
industrial activity” so as to diversify the state’s economy. In al-
most every sense, Iowa’s campaign for industry was fashioned 
to avoid threatening agriculture’s status. While the state wel-
comed any and all manufacturers interested in Iowa, and the IDC 
paid attention to non–farm-related industries, state promoters 
gave special emphasis to those firms that oriented themselves to-
ward agriculture because, as the promotional booklet affirmed, 
“Obviously, the key to Iowa’s industrial importance is her agriculture!” 
Hemp, corn, wheat, oats, pigs, chicken, milk, eggs, and other “by 
products from agriculture present endless opportunities for 
industrial development.” Iowa’s abundance of farm outputs 
would entice manufacturing and processing firms to move to the 
state to be “close to raw materials.” In a clear nod to agribusiness 
interests, this model promised to increase demand for crops and 
other goods produced on the farm.34  
 While hailing the industrial potential of Iowa’s agricultural 
abundance, promotional material also acknowledged that in-
creases in farm productivity drove people off the land, necessi-
tating new manufacturing employment for displaced workers. 
“The source of Iowa labor,” the IDC explained, “is the farm.” The 
“old fashioned” labor-intensive form of farming was “out of 
vogue in Iowa.” Farming had become “a mechanized business” 
operating with scientific instruments and methods. Thus, the 
state had witnessed “a steady outward flow of young men and 
women from the farms of Iowa over the borders of the state,” 
producing a “decrease in [farm] population of over 200,000” 
since 1900. But the IDC argued that workers released from agri-
culture would create an available pool of labor for industry. With 
mechanical know-how from their years working with tractors 
and a healthy respect for the principles of business efficiency, 
Iowa’s farm population would serve as a stable, hard-working, 
and inexpensive source of labor for manufacturers.35  
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 Iowa . . . the Land of Industrial Opportunity fully captured the 
interconnection between agriculture and industrial development. 
This linkage existed on multiple levels. First, increases in agricul-
tural productivity, as a result of mechanization and government 
policies, created a cornucopia of farm goods that might entice 
food processing and manufacturing plants to the state. Seeking 
closer access to agricultural inputs, these firms would help to en-
hance Iowa’s economic position by transforming farm products 
and raw materials into value-added consumer goods. Second, 
industrial development boosters clearly crafted their program to 
appease agribusiness interests. By focusing on farm-oriented 
enterprises, industrial development would not supplant agri-
culture but rather would benefit the farm sector by increasing 
demand for crops, eggs, meat, milk, and other products. Finally, 
and most important, the shift from labor-intensive to capital-
dependent farming reduced the number of available jobs, leading 
Iowa’s public officials to pursue new industry to keep residents 
from leaving the state. Without new manufacturing employment, 
industrial development promoters argued, the state would suffer 
from low incomes, population outmigration, and a shrinking tax 
base.  
 With all of these dynamics in play, Iowa . . . the Land of Indus-
trial Opportunity offered a comprehensive roadmap for Iowa’s 
immediate postwar economic development. Agriculture and in-
dustry would flourish side by side. Mechanization and scientific 
advancements would not be hindered, but championed, since 
greater productivity would put more money into the hands of 
farmers and create a surplus of agricultural goods that would at-
tract processing firms to Iowa. There would be fewer family farms 
(which would not be able to compete with large landholders) and 
less need for farm laborers, but that would not be a problem since 
those displaced workers would serve as a surplus labor force for 
new industry. In a disturbing twist of logic, boosters viewed 
agrarian displacement and unemployment as a selling point for 
luring industrialists in search of cheap labor. IDC promotional 
material argued that “there is a constant surplus of the finest 
labor in the world in Iowa!” “The [labor] supply comes from the 
farms, and there is no more adaptable group in the country than 
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Iowa farm boys and girls.”36 The terms “surplus” and “adapt-
able” implied the existence of a cheap, pliable workforce. In a 
harmonious and fluid process, promoters suggested, redundant 
farm labor would drift smoothly into newly created manufacturing 
jobs. Young and educated citizens, who previously had migrated 
to urban centers outside the state for greater opportunities, 
would stay in Iowa to fill these industrial positions.  
 During its early years of operation, the IDC promoted en-
terprises in harmony with farming. In 1946 the IDC published 
Why Iowa Is Great, a promotional book that lauded the “direct re-
lationship between Iowa’s industry and agriculture.” Noting that 
“more than one-half of Iowa’s industrial income directly de-
pends upon agriculture,” the book celebrated the state’s notable 
“food processing and meat packing industries,” naming specifi-
cally the Quaker Oats Company and Rath Packing Company.37 
The Development Bulletin, the IDC’s monthly news bulletin, was 
littered with articles focusing on farm-oriented industries, bearing 
headlines such as “Food Processing Top Iowa Industry” and “In-
dustry Finds Gold in Iowa Oat Fields.”38  
 In March 1951 the Development Bulletin published an article 
profiling the Independence Canning Corporation. Located in the 
small town of Independence, the firm was portrayed as an arche-
type of postwar industrial development. The company was jointly 
owned by Don Forsman of the nearby town of Fredericksburg, 
John Van Zetten and Archie Shannon of Oskaloosa, and two Chi-
cago businessmen. The plant was originally purchased in 1946. 
At that time, general manager and treasurer Darrel Forsman later 
recalled, “We thought we had a really good day if we turned out 
1200 cans of whole chicken.” By 1951 the plant was producing 
9,000 cans of chicken and turkey every day. Initially, the factory 
had canned both poultry and corn, but it eventually gave up on 
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corn when the owners “realized the peak demand for poultry 
conflicted with the sweet corn harvest.” “Under the trade name 
of Corn Blossom,” the Development Bulletin explained, “the Inde-
pendence Company puts out four sizes of whole chicken-in-the-
can” that included “disjointed halves of chicken, boneless turkey 
and chicken, and fricassee in butter gravy.” General Manager 
Forsman admitted that the company was forced to search as far 
as Tennessee, Texas, New York, and even Canada for chickens 
during slack periods, but he insisted that locally raised animals 
were their priority: “During the season, we buy all our poultry 
within 100 miles of Independence.” A relatively small plant, with 
just 85 employees in 1951, the firm had nonetheless experienced 
substantial growth since 1947, when it had employed only 25 
people.39 
 The Independence Canning Corporation embodied the IDC’s 
early vision for postwar industrialization. The firm bought most 
of its raw materials (chickens) from poultry houses within the state, 
generating greater demand for local chicken farmers. Simultane-
ously, the firm created new jobs for residents in the local com-
munity, many of whom were no doubt being turned out of agri-
culture. Rather than challenging agribusiness’s preeminence, the 
Independence Canning Corporation helped sustain large commer-
cial farmers’ quest for greater productivity, soaking up surplus 
raw materials while simultaneously capturing superfluous agri-
cultural workers.  
 
IN THE DECADES after World War II, the Iowa Development 
Commission could point to steady economic progress, as the 
number of manufacturing establishments in Iowa increased from 
2,965 to 3,388 between 1947 and 1972, while the average number 
of production workers grew from 112,490 to 157,000. Starting in 
the mid- to late 1950s, agro-industrial firms would lose their priv-
ileged place in the economic development of the rural Midwest. 
Food products would remain one of the largest industrial sectors 
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throughout the twentieth century, but other manufacturing cat-
egories, such as non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, 
fabricated metal, and transportation equipment, would experi-
ence substantial growth. The diversification of manufacturing 
throughout the rural Midwest would undermine the centrality 
of farm-oriented enterprises. This trend was apparent in Iowa, 
where, according to Wilson J. Warren, many small towns hosted 
“traditional agro-industrial companies as well as companies 
making television components, construction equipment, win-
dows and doors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and batteries.”40 
  Yet this later shift in development patterns does not negate 
the importance of agriculture in the IDC’s early activities. As-
sessing Iowa’s industrial progress up until 1956, the research 
specialist George May concluded that “the most important in-
dustries in Iowa are those which are closely linked with the 
farm—food processing plants and the farm equipment indus-
try.”41 The fact remains that the emergence of state-sponsored 
industrial development in Iowa was inextricably linked to agri-
culture. The transformation of American farming inspired, justi-
fied, and legitimated the creation of a permanent development 
agency in Iowa. If Iowa had not been experiencing rural depopu-
lation, outmigration, and farm modernization, it is inconceivable 
that the state would have invested such a significant amount of 
time, energy, and resources pursuing new industry.  
 
THE CREATION of the Iowa Development Commission in 1945 
marked the beginning of modern industrial development in Iowa. 
For the first time, the state could claim a professional, institution- 
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alized, and permanent industrialization program. The proximate 
origins of the IDC lay in the state’s wartime experience. Officials 
and residents had worried for over 20 years that low wages and 
mechanization in the farm economy would drive people out of 
the state, but it was not until World War II that industrial devel-
opment presented itself as a viable solution to those problems. The 
pursuit of munitions, ordnance, and grain alcohol plants gave 
Iowans experience in, and models for, industrial development. 
The Iowa Industrial and Defense Commission linked local com-
munities and state officials with Congress, federal bureaucracies, 
and high-ranking politicians. Wartime industrialization provided 
Iowans with a sense of hope that the state could acquire manu-
facturing concerns. At the same time, labor shortages pushed 
farmers to utilize new machinery and scientific improvements, 
resulting in fewer available agricultural jobs after the war. In 
1945 Governor Blue and the state legislature decided to meet 
agricultural transformations head on by creating the Iowa Devel-
opment Commission. The IDC presented a plan for postwar eco-
nomic development that offered industrial jobs for displaced 
farm workers, increased demand for agricultural products, and 
created a “balanced economy” for all of Iowa. The IDC’s original 
program exemplified the inseparability of agricultural transfor-
mations and industrial development during the immediate post-
war years. 
